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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
Comment on Recent Decisions
A ATEmENT-PENDENCY OF ACTION IN CIcUIT COURT NOT BAR TO SUB-
SEQUENT ACTION IN JUSTICE OF PEACE COURT-JUDGIIMENT OF JUSTICE AS
RES JuriCATA.-Plaintiff filed suit for personal injuries in the circuit court,
and later filed suit and obtained judgment on the same cause of action in a
justice of the peace court. A judgment of five thousand dollars was re-
covered in the circuit court, in which action the defendant pleaded the
judgment of the justice in bar of the suit pending in the circuit court.
Held, the judgment of the justice was binding on the parties as against
second suit for same injuries in the circuit court, even though the circuit
court action was commenced before judgment was entered in the justice
court. Drake v. Kansas City Public Service Co. (Mo. App. 1931) 41 S. W.
(2d) 1066.
It is of course settled law that a judgment rendered by a court of com-
petent jurisdiction on the merits is a bar to any future suit between the
same parties or their privies, upon the same cause of action, in the same or
another court. 34 C. J. 750; Couch v. Harp (1907) 201 Mo. 457, 100
S. W. 9. And the general rule is that the order in which the suits are
brought is immaterial in the determination of this question. 34 C. J. 758,
886; Poorman v. Mitchell (1871) 48 Mo. 45. The fact that the judgment
pleaded in bar was rendered by a justice of the peace does not make it any
less effective for this purpose,-a judgment on the merits rendered by an
inferior court being as conclusive as the judgment of any Other court.
34 C. J. 878; Cooksey v. The Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs Rail-
road Co. (1881) 74 Mo. 477. Nor does the prior filing of the suit in the
circuit court deprive the justice court of jurisdiction over the suit subse-
quently filed in that court in the absence of a plea in abatement on the
ground of pendency of the same cause in another court. No such objection
present, the justice court has power to proceed as if no suit had been filed
in the circuit court. If the suit in the justice court is won and the defend-
ant appeals, the plaintiff may dismiss his suit and he would then be in a
position to sue in the circuit court subsequently to the dismissal. Cooksey
v. The Kansas City, St. Joseph & Council Bluffs Railroad Co., above.
In view of the judgment for the plaintiff for five thousand dollars in the
circuit court, it would seem that the reversal in the principal case might
work a grave injustice as to the substantive merits of the claim. However,
inasmuch as the justice suit was filed by the plaintiff subsequently to the
circuit court suit, the decision is justifiable on the ground that the plaintiff
had exercised his option of pursuing his cause of action to judgment in
either court. There is no apparent reason why the plaintiff should be al-
lowed to obtain judgment in both courts and subject the defendant to two
suits. While injustice may have been done in this particular instance, it
can be referred to the plaintiff's own choice, and it seems better that the
principle of res judicata be adhered to.
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The choice of remedies made by the plaintiff operated even more harshly
to the plaintiff's disadvantage in Little v. Blue Goose Motor Coach Co. (11.
1931) 178 N. E. 496. The plaintiff recovered a judgment for five thousand
dollars for the death of her husband, the petition charging negligence on
the part of the defendant. The defendant had previously sued the deceased
in a justice of the peace court for damages to its bus and had recovered
judgment. The deceased appealed from the justice's decision but the ap-
peal was later dismissed for want of prosecution. The deceased's wife was
substituted as plaintiff in the circuit court case upon the death of her hus-
band. It was held that when the appeal was dismissed, and procedendo
issued, the justice's judgment became a final determination between the
parties and those in privity with them, and the circuit court judgment was
reversed. Since there was a trial on the issue of negligence in the justice
court, it seems that the apparent injustice is due entirely to the failure of
the deceased to prosecute the appeal and that the principle of the case is in
accord both with logic and established law. H. H. G., '33.
CHATTEL MORTgAGES-RECORDING--RIGHTS OF INNOCENT THIRD PARTIEs.
-To secure the purchase price on refrigerating units installed in two
apartment houses in St. Louis County, chattel mortgages were executed
and filed for record in the City of St. Louis. The defendant purchased the
property at a foreclosure sale under deeds of trust securing loans on the
realty. The owner of these deeds of trust had purchased them sometime
previous to the foreclosure without actual notice of the chattel mortgages.
The plaintiff brought an action in replevin to recover possession of the
refrigerators. Held, that by the installation of the units, they lost their
character as personalty and became fixtures, and that as between the vend-
or and a third party, an encumbrancer of the realty, the fling of the
chattel mortgage in the City of St. Louis was not notice, actual or con-
structive, of the plaintiff's rights so as to enable plaintiff to recover. Kel-
vinator St. Louis, Inc. v. Schader (Mo. App. 1931) 39 S. W. (2d) 385.
To determine whether personal property becomes a fixture three ele-
ments are usually considered by the courts: annexation, adaptation, and in-
tent. St. Louis Rad. Mfg. Co. v. Carroll (1897) 72 Mo. App. 315. The lat-
ter two are most important for the courts have shown a tendency to pay
more regard to the intent of the parties, as affected by the custom of the
locality, and the nature of the article, rather than to consider the facility
of displacement. In re Danville Hotel Co. (C. C. A. 8, 1930) 38 F. (2d) 10.
See (1919) 18 MIcH. L. Rav. 405. The mode of annexation, however, is
important in determining the rights of one who intends to purchase or en-
cumbrance the realty to which the article is attached, with regard to the
aspect of notice of prior rights of other persons in that fixture. In the
principal case, because the articles appeared by their physical attachment
to be a part of the realty, they were so construed.
The authorities are in unison to the effect that such a chattel mortgage
is binding on the original parties and on all subsequent purchasers or en-
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